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Abstract:   State guaranty funds provide partial protection to life insurance holders in the
event of an insolvency, thus creating a moral hazard problem akin to the one associated
with deposit insurance in the banking industry.  We find that differences across states in
the financing of these government guaranty systems affects risk taking by life insurance
companies (LICs).  In states where taxpayers do not pay for the costs of resolving
insolvencies, LICs hold portfolios with lower overall stock market risk.  These portfolios,
however, are characterized by higher levels of both capital and risky assets.  These
empirical findings have policy implications for improving monitoring of financial
intermediaries receiving government liability guarantees.  We also examine the effects of
franchise value, size and ownership structure on portfolio risk.  We find that larger LICs
and LICs with more franchise value take less risk.  We also find that risk decreases with
insider holdings until insiders own about 25 percent of the firm and increases thereafter.3
The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with
Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry
One of the consequences of the large number of costly financial institution failures in
recent years has been a reassessment of the impact of government guarantees on risk taking
behavior. It has been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that deposit insurance for
commercial banks and savings and loan associations (S&Ls) creates a moral hazard problem by
shielding creditors from the consequences of risk taking.
l As a result, banks and thrifts have a
greater desired level of risk than they would otherwise have in the absence of deposit insurance.
Harrington (1991) raises the concern that the government guarantees of insurance company
liabilities may lead to similar problems.
This paper studies the determinants of portfolio risk and its components (leverage and
asset risk) for a sample of publicly-traded stock life insurance companies (LICs) with these
incentive problems in mind.
2 Our study extends the literature in a number of ways. First, we
construct a novel data set by combining LIC stock market data with accounting information from
the Statutory Reports of Condition filed with the state insurance commissions. We use these data
to relate both stock market and balance sheet measures of risk to firm characteristics in order to
explain cross-sectional differences in risk taking. Second, we identify how the moral hazard
problem stemming from the presence of government guarantees of LIC liabilities has been
contained. Although there exists no federal program protecting life insurance policyholders from
insolvencies, individual states have established guaranty funds. Given that state insurance
guaranty funds create incentives for LICs to increase risk, we ask how regulatory policies and the
financing of the guaranty funds have limited these incentives.
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Financial theory suggests that changes in asset mix or financial leverage should influence
the value of equity. Because shareholders hold residual claims on earnings, their interests often
diverge from those of other stakeholders. Limited liability provides shareholders with the
incentive to invest in risky assets. If the risky investments pay off, shareholders keep all the
gains; if losses are incurred, they are shared with other stakeholders. While shareholders have
incentives to increase risk and leverage, however, there are offsetting factors which weigh against
these incentives. In an unregulated environment, bondholders enforce covenants which limit
management’s ability to increase risk and facilitate a transfer of wealth from the bondholders to
the shareholders. In the case of the life insurance industry, where the bulk of liabilities are in the
form of life insurance policy and annuity reserves, regulators restrict risk taking behavior by
enforcing capital adequacy standards and limiting the kinds of assets that may be held.
Beyond regulatory discipline, we find evidence consistent with the idea that larger LICs
hold less risk, that LICs whose management hold a larger share of the firm take less risk, and that
LICs with greater franchise value take less risk. Each of these results is consistent with recent
evidence from the banking industry. For instance, Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) find that
firm-specific risk increases with the concentrations of ownership by insiders at bank holding
companies. In contrast, however, note that Gorton and Rosen (1995) find that balance sheet
measures of risk decline with management holdings. Our results appear consistent with the
earlier Saunders, et al findings. Keeley (1990) and Acharya (1996) find that banks with higher
franchise value are safer than banks with little or no franchise value, consistent with our findings
for LICs. Demsetz and Strahan (1995) show that large bank holding companies are better5
diversified than small and thus, ceteris paribus, less risky. We also interpret the negative
relationship between size and LIC risk as a diversification effect.
Given the clear incentive problems associated with government guarantees, one important
policy question that arises is how best to structure such guarantees to mitigate these problems.
This paper provides new evidence that the financing of government guaranty systems can be an
important determinant of risk taking behavior. In contrast to federal deposit insurance, the
method used to pay for resolutions of failed LICs differs across states. Consequently, the life
insurance industry provides a convenient laboratory in which to study how the financial structure
of a government guarantee affects firm behavior.
Studies of state-administered deposit insurance systems of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries have shown that their success depended on precisely how the member banks
paid for the insurance. For example, Calomiris (1989) found that systems of mutual liability,
self-regulating deposit insurance in the pre-Civil War era were successful in dealing with
financial panics. In these systems, surviving member banks were responsible for paying off
depositors of failed institutions. Calomiris contrasts their success with the state deposit
insurance systems of the 1914-1929 era, which led member banks to engage in excessive risk
taking and rapid growth. These later systems failed because banks had little incentive to monitor
the behavior of other member banks, with deposit insurance giving each institution an incentive
to increase risk.
A more recent use of mutual liability, self-regulating guaranty systems can be found in
exchange clearinghouses. A clearinghouse serves as a guarantor to member firms’ trades to
mitigate credit risk exposure. Clearing associations have an incentive to monitor the insolvency6
risk of members because losses can be pro-rated among other clearinghouse members [Baer and
Evanoff (1990) and Rutz (1989)]. However, by ceding the monitoring function to the
clearinghouse, the individual
there were no clearinghouse.
firms do not have the same incentive to monitor as they would if
Thus, even in a market with a clearinghouse overseeing activity,
the sharing of insolvency costs tends to encourage risk taking and provides incentives to use the
system for subsidies or transfers between the members.
In a similar vein, we examine which methods used to finance state guaranty funds are
most successful in promoting financially stable LICs. These funds are currently financed by ex
post assessments made on surviving LICs operating in the individual states where a failure has
occurred.
4 The cost of an insurance resolution is prorated based on the proportion of total
premiums collected within the state by the remaining LICs. However, in 39 states the incentive
to engage in industry self-monitoring is quite weak because LICs may credit these assessments
against their state premium taxes. In a study of 1990 life-health guaranty fund assessment costs,
Barrese and Nelson (1992) found that over 80 percent of the present discounted value of these
assessments was borne by taxpayers because of federal and state tax offsets. In the other states,
companies are permitted to add a premium surcharge but may not credit assessment costs against
taxes. In these cases, profits of surviving LICs would decline if they are unable to pass all of the
assessment costs onto existing policyholders.
The cross-sectional variation in the financing of the funds allows us to estimate whether
the imposition of higher costs on survivors affects portfolio behavior. Our results indicate that in
states where taxpayers pay for the majority of costs of resolving failed firms, LICs hold
significantly more capital and more risky assets than do LICs operating in states without tax7
offsets. The net effect of these portfolio changes is a reduction in overall risk. These findings
are consistent with the performance of the early state deposit insurance funds.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. Section one describes the
proposed determinants of LIC portfolio risk and presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section
two presents the model specification, describes the data sources and variables used in the
analysis, and presents the results. Section three concludes.
I. The Determinants of LIC Risk
In this section, we describe the determinants of the choice of risk at LICs that we examine
in our empirical analysis. We begin with the idea that limited liability gives equity holders an
incentive to increase risk, both by increasing leverage and increasing portfolio risk.
In an unregulated environment, discipline from creditors provides the main offset to the
incentive to increase risk stemming from limited liability. If creditors face increased costs
associated with default when the firm increases leverage and/or portfolio risk, as they do in the
absence of government guarantees, they will monitor the firm’s performance and enforce
restrictive covenants during periods of financial distress. In the life insurance industry, the
incentive to perform this costly monitoring function is reduced by the presence of the state
guaranty funds. Nevertheless, LIC creditors may still have some incentive to hold risk taking in
check, both because they lack full confidence in or knowledge of the state guarantees and
because the state guarantees provide less than complete protection for policyholders.
In fact, guaranty fund coverage does vary from state to state. In most states, policyholders
are protected up to $300,000 in death benefits, $100,000 in cash or withdrawal value for life8
insurance, $100,000 in present value of annuity benefits and $100,000 in health benefits. Some
states also cover unallocated annuities such as GICs up to a certain amount (usually $5 million).
Even if policyholders are fully protected by the fund, the state can take several years to liquidate
a failed company; hence, creditors may not have full access to their funds immediately.
Policyholders can impose creditor discipline by taking out policy loans or surrendering the
policies for their cash value. As a result, the LIC is not only constrained to keep risk and
leverage at acceptable levels but also to maintain sufficient liquidity to meet potential cash
demands from its customers.
LICs’ propensity to engage in high-risk behavior is also likely limited by regulatory
pressure, as Merton (1977) and Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) noted for the banking industry.
LICs with weak balance sheets may face greater regulatory scrutiny, increased audit frequency
and limitations on asset holding powers, all of which impose costs on the firm. In theory, this
mechanism prevents insured firms from exploiting the incentive to engage in excessively risky
activities provided by government liability guarantees. However, the degree of regulatory
scrutiny may vary across institutions. Ely and Weaver (1990) have shown that over the period
1981:1-1986:1 large commercial banks facing less regulatory pressure because they are
presumably “too big to fail,” do, in fact, take advantage of easier regulation by holding less
capital.
In the insurance industry, the degree of regulatory scrutiny varies widely across firms. As
summarized in Cummins (1988), insurance companies are monitored by both state regulators as
well as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). In general, site audits by
state insurance examiners are performed once every three to five years. However, the NAIC does9
computerized audits of LICs on an annual basis, and companies that fail four or more of eleven
audit ratio tests are subject to greater regulatory review. Nevertheless, the quality of
examinations can vary due to the size and sophistication of the state insurance departments and
the amount of resources a state government wishes to allocate to the supervision of insurance
companies. Life insurance companies chartered to operate in the state of New York, for instance,
face particularly stringent regulatory and capital adequacy requirements. In our empirical
analysis, we consider whether the more stringent regulatory environment in New York reduces
risk taking by firms operating there.
Beyond direct regulatory scrutiny, the incentive of life insurance companies to lobby
successfully for less restrictive regulations or scrutiny may vary across states. As noted in the
introduction, in some states surviving companies do not receive tax credits for assessments to the
state guaranty fund following an insolvency. In these states, surviving LICs have a greater
incentive to monitor and pressure regulators to take prompt corrective actions against companies
likely to become insolvent. While the incentive to pursue a high risk strategy is unaffected by
whether or not surviving firms or taxpayers pay for resolutions, when surviving LICs actually
bear the cost of the insolvencies they will be more concerned with the financial health of other
LICs in the state.
A third factor which will tend to offset LIC’s tendency to increase risk is the firm’s level
of franchise value, defined as the present value of future profits that the firm can generate as a
going concern. Better-run firms, for instance those with superior efficiency to their competitors,
or older firms with longstanding customer relationship based on reputation, will tend to have
more franchise value than newer, less efficient firms. Previous research on moral hazard in10
banking has shown that franchise value works to mitigate banks’ incentives to increase risk (see
Marcus 1984, Keeley 1990, and Acharya 1996). In fact, some argue that the dramatic increase in
risk taking, both at banks and thrifts, was the result of the secular decline in franchise value
which began in the late 1960s and persisted throughout the 1980s.
Franchise value can act to reduce risk taking in two ways. First, like capital, franchise
value gives equity holders a larger stake in the firm and thus more to lose if things go bad. To
the extent that management acts to maximize shareholder value (rather than firm value),
franchise value will thereby tend to reduce the incentive to increase risk. Franchise value may
also act like a bankruptcy cost if much of its value is lost if the firm becomes bankrupt. Thus,
even in a world where management acts to maximize total firm value, franchise value may lead
to reduced risk taking by increasing bankruptcy costs.
The notion that franchise value may be lost in insolvency follows naturally in the banking
industry, since banks often lend based on private information about borrower quality. Because
of this private information, a large fraction of the bank’s assets cannot be sold to third parties for
their full value. Hence, much of the bank’s franchise value could be lost in insolvency. Like
banks, a large proportion of the typical insurance company’s assets is not fully marketable. For
instance, life insurance companies purchase 50 to 80 percent of newly-issued private placement
debt (Carey, Prowse, Rea and Udell 1993). A secondary market in privately placed debt has only
recently developed between institutional investors as a result of Rule 144A (adopted by the SEC
in April 1990). Nevertheless, LICs still stand to lose some of their franchise value in insolvency;
those with more franchise value have, in effect, higher bankruptcy costs.11
Finally, the conflict between management and stockholders may affect the firm’s
willingness to bear risk, since risk averse management may rationally choose to hold a safer
portfolio than that which maximizes firm value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others suggest
that managers receive private benefits from control of the firm. Because managers have an
undiversifiable stake in the firm that employs their human capital, they have an incentive to limit
risk in order to protect their stake. Thus, the willingness of firms to invest in risky assets may be
held in check by the concern of managers for their future employment.
Previous research has shown that firm performance is related to ownership of insiders,
although that relationship may not be monotonic (Merck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988). At low
levels of management holdings, increases in ownership increases management entrenchment,
thus leading to lower firm value. In the context of risk taking, this suggests that increases in
management holdings will reduce risk over this range. At higher levels, increases in
management holdings tend to facilitate alignment between the interests of shareholders and
management. So, we expect increases in management holdings over this range to increase LIC
risk.
II. The Impact of Firm-Specific factors on LIC Risk
A. Model Description and Data Sources
Dependent Variables
This section develops the empirical framework used to test how management’s selection
of portfolio risk is affected by the existence of policyholder guarantees and other variables. We
estimate a reduced form regression which relates the level of risk to a set of predetermined12
variables thought to affect the firm’s choice of risk. Our primary measure of risk is the standard
deviation of the daily stock return. This is an “all-in” concept of risk which incorporates risks
associated with all of the firm’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet positions and reflects any
diversification across those positions. In addition, stock market volatility reflects firm leverage.
That is, firms with greater leverage generally have more volatile stocks since a given degree of
portfolio risk has a greater effect on equity values for firms with greater leverage.
We also explore the determinants of two balance sheet measures of risk, the capital-asset
ratio as a measure of leverage and the ratio of junk bonds to total bonds as a measure of asset
quality. The latter variable serves this purpose because junk bonds are the riskiest component of
the typical insurance company’s assets and bonds themselves account for the bulk of LIC assets
(about 60 percent in our sample).
Explanatory Variables
Following the discussion in Section I, we include variables to control for the effects of the
financial structure of the state guaranty funds, for the effects of franchise value, and for the
effects of ownership structure on the firm’s choice of risk. To test for the effects of the way the
state guaranty funds are financed, we include the proportion of premium income from states that
do not permit LICs to credit guaranty fund assessments against state premium taxes. Ideally, one
would compare the risk choices of LICs operating only in states with tax offsets with those
choices for LICs operating strictly in states without offsets, but most of the LICs in our sample
operate in multiple states. As noted above, we expect that LICs receiving a greater share of
premium income in states without tax offsets will choose to operate with lower total risk.
As a measure of franchise value, we include the ratio of the book value of equity to themarket value of equity. This variable will decline with LIC franchise value.
market ratio (rather than its inverse) since market capital is always positive.
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We use the book-to-
This variable, of
course, is only a proxy for franchise value. In fact, when LICs become severely financially
distressed the market value of equity will reflect, in large part, the option value of the
government guarantee of life insurance products. Note, however, that this problem will tend to
generate a downward bias on the coefficient associated with franchise value since the value of
government guarantees (and thus the market value of equity) will be greater at riskier firms. This
bias works in our favor since we expect to observe a positive coefficient on the book-to- market
ratio. In addition, we have tried to control for this problem by including an indicator variable
equal to one for LICs which failed during the sample period.
To control for the effects of agency problems associated with the separation of ownership
and control, we include the percent of stock owned by managers and directors. We also include
the square of insider holdings. As noted, previous researchers have found that at low levels of
insider holdings, increases in the percent of stock owned by management worsens performance
(e.g. Tobin’s Q), presumably because such increases in insider holdings help entrench
management. At higher levels, increases in insider holdings tend to improve performance as
managers’ incentives become better aligned with those of shareholders. Thus, we expect LIC
risk taking to decline with insider holdings in the entrenchment region and then to increase with
insider holdings in the alignment region.
Following Cummins and Sommer (forthcoming), we also include a series of other control
variables in the model. We add the log of total assets and the number of states in which the LIC
operates to control for diversification effects. We include an indicator equal to one for LICs14
operating the New York state, an indicator for LICs using independent agents to market their life
insurance policies and an indicator for whether life insurance holding companies have multiple
life insurance subsidiaries.
Data Sources
The model was estimated on a sample of 59 publicly-traded insurance companies
specializing in life insurance (greater than 60% of their assets) for each year for which all data
were available from the end of 1986 to the end of 1991.
5 We have complete data for 344 out of a
possible 354 firm-years. Stock market data for the 59 companies are from Interactive Data
Services, Inc.  A list of the corporations used in this study is presented in Table 1. Balance sheet
variables are from the Statutory Reports of Condition that insurance companies are required to
file with state regulators at the end of each year. For multiple LIC holding companies, we
aggregate (sum) the assets and liabilities of individual subsidiaries. Our measure of insider
holdings is based on Proxy Statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Note that we were only able to collect insider holdings for 305 out of the total 344 firm-years in
our sample.
Regression Specification
We estimate the regression equations on the pooled time series/cross-section data set
using ordinary least squares.
6 The volatility of daily stock returns is estimated separately for
each firm during year t and regressed on variables measured as of the end of year t. We include
a set of time fixed effects in all regressions to control for common shocks to risk across
companies. These fixed effects control, for example, for changes in demand conditions in the
industry as well as for changes in general economic conditions which could affect overall firm15
risk and leverage. We also estimate the model with firm fixed effects to control for firm-specific
factors not accounted for by the variables included in the model. Since some of our explanatory
variables are time-invariant, we present the model based on all-in risk with and without firm
fixed effects.
B. Results
The means and standard deviations of all of the variables in the model appear in Table 2.
The average daily stock market volatility equals 0.028, or about 0.46 on an annualized basis. The
capital-asset ratio averages a little more than 12 percent in our sample and about 7 percent of the
average LIC’s total bonds are less than investment grade (junk). The market to book ratio
averages about 1.3, suggesting that during our sample period life insurance stock generally sold
below book value. This is not surprising since our sample covers a period in which both the junk
bond and commercial real estate markets faced severe downturns. Total assets average about $5
billion in our sample, ranging from $5 million to $47 billion. On average, about 16 percent of
total premium income comes from states without tax offsets, although one LIC in our sample
received as much as 97 percent of total premium income in these states. Finally, insider
ownership averages a little over 10 percent.
The results of estimating the risk equation using stock return volatility as the dependent
variable appear in Table 3. The first two columns report the results which exclude insider
holdings. The last two columns report the results with insider holdings included in the model.
As reported in the first row, there is a robust, positive relationship between risk and the
book-to-market ratio. As expected, firms with higher franchise value take less risk. This finding
is consistent with studies of risk taking in banking and suggests that moral hazard problems are,16
in part, contained when firms have more to lose in the event of insolvency (Marcus 1984, Keeley
1990 and Acharya 1996).
7 Also, we find some evidence that larger LICs are less risky than
smaller ones, although this result does not hold up in the model with firm fixed effects.
The third row of Table 3 provides evidence that overall LIC risk is lower when firms face
some of the costs associated with insolvencies by their competitors. In both of the models
without firm fixed effects (i.e. with and without insider holdings), the coefficient associated with
the proportion of premium income from states without tax offsets is negative and statistically
significant at the one percent level. In fact, the coefficient in the first model suggests that a one
standard deviation increase in the proportion of total premium income earned in states without
tax offsets leads to a decrease in risk of about 0.003, or about 10 percent of the unconditional
mean. In both of the models which include firm fixed effects, however, the coefficient, while
still negative, is no longer statistically significant.
In columns three and four we find that insider holdings are statistically significantly
related to LIC risk taking. The F-test on the joint significance of the linear and squared terms is
statistically significant at the one percent level in both models. Moreover, the negative
coefficient on the linear term and positive coefficient on the squared term indicates that risk falls
with insider holdings up to some point and then rises thereafter. The inflection point occurs
when insiders hold about 25 percent of the firm based on the model with firm fixed effects. This
is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), who find a negative relation between
insider holdings and Tobin’s Q when insider holdings are between 5 percent and 25 percent, and
then a positive relationship beyond 25 percent.
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Columns one and three of Table 3 present the results which include the structural control
variables which do not vary over time (these two models do not include firm fixed effects).
These results suggest, not surprisingly, that LICs which failed during the sample period exhibited
higher stock market risk.
9 Interestingly, LICs whose products are distributed through
independent agents display greater risk, suggesting perhaps that market discipline is reduced
when policyholders rely on independent agents.
10   We find no evidence that LICs operating in
New York display less risk, despite New York’s more stringent regulation of the life insurance
industry. Finally, LICs operating across more states exhibit less risk, presumably as a
consequence of better diversification opportunities. As an alternative explanation, LICs
operating in more states may face greater monitoring because they are regulated by more state
insurance departments.
Table 4 presents the relationship between balance sheet measures of risk and the variables
of interest in the model with firm fixed effects. The intent of this analysis is to understand how
the determinants of overall risk affect the key components of risk, namely leverage and asset risk.
As shown, we find that firms with greater franchise value (i.e. firms with lower book-to-
market equity ratios) hold fewer risky assets, although franchise value does not appear to
influence leverage. By contrast, size is positively related to leverage but only weakly negatively
related to risky assets. This is consistent with Demsetz and Strahan (1995), who find that large
bank holding companies hold less capital than small banking companies. Note that the greater
leverage of larger LICs suggests enhanced diversification associated with size, since Table 3
shows that larger LICs exhibit, if anything, less overall risk than do smaller LICs. These findings
are consistent with Cummins and Sommer (forthcoming), who argue that larger LICs’ better18
diversification allows them to operate at their optimal level of risk with less capital than smaller
LICs.
The third row of Table 4 shows that firms operating in states without tax offsets for
payments to the guaranty fund hold both more capital and more risky assets.
ll Note that these
results are economically, as well as statistically, large. For instance, a one standard deviation
increase in the proportion of income from states without tax offsets increases the capital-asset
ratio by about one percentage point. Evidently, LICs operating in states without tax offsets
achieve reductions in overall risk by holding more capital. Nevertheless, this reduction in risk is
attenuated to some degree by increases in risky assets.
offsets
An alternative interpretation of the positive association between the presence of tax
and overall risk is that the life insurance industry possesses greater political influence in
states with tax offsets (and thus LICs can take more risks in these states). To test this notion, we
looked at the proportion of revenues for each company earned in states in which the insurance
commissioner was elected rather than appointed. Since we find no correlation between the
presence of tax offsets and the method by which the various states choose their insurance
commissioner, we reject this alternative view in favor of the notion that the tax offsets
themselves influence LIC risk taking behavior.
Finally, column 4 of Table 4 suggests that insider holdings influence the choice of asset
risk but not leverage. Although neither coefficient on insider holdings is individually significant,
the F-test on both the linear and squared terms is jointly statistically significant at the 10 percent
level in the model with firm fixed effects. Consistent with the results based on all-in risk (Table19
3), we again find that asset risk falls with insider holdings up to some point and then rises
thereafter.
C. LIC Performance and the Determinants of Risk
Table 5 presents the relationship between the determinants of risk and LIC performance,
as measured by the return on assets (the ratio of net income to total assets). Three main results
emerge from this analysis. First, firms with higher franchise value as measured by the book-to-
market ratio appear to have lower average performance based on return on assets. This result is
consistent with the results in Table 4 which show that low franchise value firms are more likely
to hold risky assets such as junk bonds which generate high income (conditional on solvency).
Second, in the model without firm fixed effects LICs operating in states without tax offsets also
exhibit higher asset returns. This result is presumably the effect of their lower leverage (see
Table 4). Finally, LICs using independent agents to distribute their products exhibit
significantly lower return on assets. This result is surprising since we find that these LICs are
also riskier than those that do not use independent agents. A partial explanation for this result is
that agent firms tend to have higher costs and lower profit margins than direct writers (Cummins
and Sommer, forthcoming).
III. Conclusions
State guarantees of life insurance liabilities present LICs with the incentive to hold highly
leveraged portfolios composed of risky assets. In the simple option framework of Merton (1977),
stockholder wealth may be increased indefinitely by raising risk because of the asymmetric
payoff: all upside gains accrue to shareholders while, particularly for poorly capitalized20
institutions, little is at risk on the downside. These incentives can be contained by regulatory and
creditor discipline. We also find that LIC risk taking is affected in important ways by firm
specific factors such as franchise value, size, and ownership structure.
Our findings have an important policy implication. The empirical results indicate that the
way the state guaranty funds are financed affects the behavior of LICs. The use of premium tax
credits for guaranty fund assessments encourages LICs to increase overall risk, mainly by holding
less capital. We believe the mechanism behind this finding is better industry self-monitoring in
states without tax offsets. By eliminating these tax credits, the surviving LICs have a stronger
incentive to pressure regulators to decrease the likelihood of failures. This finding should be of
great interest to policymakers concerned with the long run viability of the state guaranty funds.
Just as private insurance arrangements typically include co-payments and deductibles, well
structured government guarantees of private liabilities should include similar features designed to
impose some costs on insured liability holders in the event of an insolvency.21
FOOTNOTES
lMerton (1977) was the first to demonstrate this result by modeling deposit insurance as a put
option. For empirical evidence on the incentive effects of deposit insurance at S&Ls, see Barth,
Bartholomew and Labich (1989), Brickley and James (1986), Kane (1985, 1989) and Brewer and
Mondschean (1994).
2The term life insurance companies (LICs) is used throughout to refer to firms that are classified
as life and/or life-health insurance companies.
3See Gilbert (1990) for a discussion of the effects of market discipline on the behavior of
depository institutions.
4Similar funding arrangements for deposit insurance are used in Austria, Chile, France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Switzerland. See U.S. Treasury (1991), page XXI-3. 1991.
5We included one company, the Travelers Corporation, that had less than 60 percent of their
consolidated assets in life insurance because it is one of the largest firms in the insurance
industry. Also, data for two companies, Financial Benefit Group and Unum Corporation, were
not available in the fourth quarter of 1986.
6For a discussion of the existence of “other effects” in time series, cross sectional analysis, see
Balestra and Nerlove (1966).
7 The observed positive correlation between stock market volatility and the book-to-market ratio
could be a spurious relationship caused by the fact that we use end of period measures of the
right-hand side variables. (We do this to preserve degrees of freedom). If, for instance, declines
in stock prices are associated with high measured volatility while increases are not also22
associated with high volatility, then the positive correlation may have nothing to do with the
hypothesized effects of franchise value on risk taking. However, we also find that firms with low
book-to-market ratios hold fewer risky assets, suggesting that franchise value is indeed related to
a LIC’s choice of risk.
8An alternative interpretation of the relationship between risk and ownership structure is offered
by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), who suggest that firms with higher risk require a greater degree of
insider holdings, since it may be harder to monitor and control management in riskier firms. We
agree that this interpretation is likely to be valid in making comparisons of ownership structure
for firms in different industries. This is another reason why we present our results both with and
without the insider holdings variables. We believe that within the life insurance industry,
however, the firm’s ownership structure is unlikely to be caused by the firm’s risk, which
depends most critically on the choices of leverage and asset risk--choices which are clearly under
management control.
9For a discussion of the causes
the life insurance industry, see
and consequences of the recent financial distress experienced in
Fields, et al (forthcoming), Fenn and Cole (1994), Brewer and
Mondschean (1993) and Todd and Wallace (1992).
10For a discussion of these issues, see Cummins and Sommer (forthcoming).
11Note that when we estimate the models of Table 4 without firm fixed effects, we find a positive
coefficient on the proportion of premium income from states without tax offsets, although these
results are only significant at the 17 percent level in the model without insider holdings and the
12 percent level in the model with insider holdings. We do not present these results because
firm-specific errors are likely to be important in regressions with dependent variables from the23
balance sheet. For instance, deviations of book capital from economic capital are likely to be
related to the types of assets held by the firm. To the extent that those assets, and thus the
measurement error in the model, are related to the amount of business conducted in states
without tax offsets, omitting the fixed effects will tend to bias the estimated coefficient on this
variable. In fact, the coefficient on proportion of business in states without tax offsets is positive
and significant at the one percent level in the model without firm fixed effects when we include
risky assets as a regressor.24
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